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1. Introduction 
 
Africa is home to countless terrorist organizations, including Boko Haram 
in Nigeria and al-Shabaab in Somalia. Both groups have received extensive 
coverage through news reports and academic texts. Such attentiveness has aimed 
to explain how both terrorist groups began, how they have flourished and their 
links to groups such as al-Qa’ida and the Islamic State. Understanding why both 
Nigeria and Somalia have received different levels of foreign intervention to help 
suppress their respective terrorist organizations is critical. In doing so, the relative 
strength of a state in the case of Nigeria (Boko Haram) and Somalia (al-Shabaab) 
influences the level of foreign intervention both countries receive to defeat their 
terrorist groups. The relative strength of a state either allows or limits the amount 
of foreign intervention. 
State fragility and provisional indicators are used to understand how 
Nigeria is categorized as a weak state and Somalia a failed state.1 This allows for 
a deeper understanding of the countries’ strength. In answering the question, why 
Nigeria’s Boko Haram and Somalia’s al-Shabab have received different levels of 
foreign intervention the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) for Nigeria and 
the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for Somalia are the foreign 
interventions fighting the terrorist groups. The analysis of the foreign 
interventions shows evidence of variances regarding size and overall efforts. 
Both Boko Haram and al-Shabaab receive distinct levels of foreign 
intervention for various possible reasons. In the case of Somalia, the relative state 
strength is "failed" which helps understand why such large and well-funded 
AMISOM response continues.2 On the other hand, Nigeria’s relative state strength 
is “weak” and has seen a smaller and less funded operation in the MNJTF.3 A few 
scholars and policymakers would like to move away from the Westphalian-state 
system in Africa to help alleviate issues such as those Nigeria and Somalia are 
facing. This recommendation might offer a solution but working within the 
current system is imperative in solving many of the issues plaguing Africa. 
Countries must strengthen themselves to tackle terrorist groups but also issues the 
Westphalian-state system has caused. 
 
                                                     
1 Monty G. Marshall and Gabrielle Elzinga-Marshall, "State Fragility Index and Matrix 2016," 
Center for Systemic Peace, accessed May 26, 2018, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/SFImatrix2016c.pdf. 
2 "AMISOM Mandate," African Union Mission in Somalia, accessed May 15, 2018, 
http://amisom-au.org/amisom-mandate/. 
3 Joe Bavier, "Regional Armies Struggle in Last Push Against Boko Haram," Reuters, accessed 
May 12, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security-niger-insight-
idUSKCN1051QI. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
Nigeria and Somalia have received differing levels of foreign intervention 
geared towards their respective groups, Boko Haram, and al-Shabaab.  Identity 
fissures, oil production and the levels of corruption are a few plausible causes for 
the different levels of intervention. There are several ways to understand these 
alternative causes, which are valid and can serve in understanding the levels of 
intervention Boko Haram and al-Shabaab receive. Identity fissures are a possible 
cause for the difference in foreign intervention. According to Ian S. Spears, 
colonial rule left many Africans with no sense of identity, especially after the 
establishment of state boundaries.4 Western nations divided Africa during the 
Berlin Congress in 1884 which divided ethnic groups who lived across multiple 
regions placing them within a state. The ex-colonial powers established these 
boundaries to maximize their exploiting efforts and remain in control of the land 
and people. The consequences of colonialism and the drawing of borders have 
influenced the sense of identity in many African countries. 
Differences between these groups can surface because they have been 
forced to live in a country. Such identity divisions in a country create a 
challenging environment for foreign intervention to take place, compared to a 
country that has an overarching identity. An intervening nation or coalition will 
have to account for the multiple groups who might have different cultures, 
practice different religions and speak distinct languages. If a country has an 
overarching identity, it can simplify the mission because there are fewer 
differences to address, resulting in fewer obstacles for foreign interventions. The 
complexity of identity can hinder or facilitate the level of foreign intervention. 
Moreover, resources can explain the different levels of foreign 
intervention a country receives to tackle terrorist organizations. As Paul D. 
Williams points out, oil is the resource that pushes governments to try to have a 
keen hold on their country.5 Such take on oil influences a country’s willingness to 
participate and allow foreign intervention. Countries that produce oil will have 
significant incentives and funds to control its territory, especially the oil-
producing regions. The lack of oil lowers the possibilities of a government 
gaining funds from the sale and export of oil thus leading to the need for foreign 
intervention. 
Corruption within a government’s agencies and institutions impedes the 
advancements of foreign intervention. If government officials are corrupt, this can 
dissuade foreign intervention. As Simon Gray and Ibikunle Adeakin underline, 
                                                     
4 Ian S. Spears, "The State System and Africa's Permanent Instability," in Routledge Handbook of 
African Security, ed. James J. Hentz (Routledge, 2013): 117. 
5 Paul D. Williams, "Resources," in War and conflict in Africa, (Polity Press, 2016): 100. 
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corruption can lead to failure in counter-terrorism efforts against a group.6  The 
existence of sympathizers of a terrorist group within the government makes 
counter-terrorist efforts difficult and counter-productive. This environment can 
cause foreign actors to think twice before intervening. However, if a state has 
lower levels of corruption, this will facilitate foreign intervention efforts. Foreign 
actors can maneuver and engage a terrorist group with a lower concern for 
operational security leaks. 
For Nigeria and Somalia, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab pose significant 
threats. The different levels of foreign intervention that both countries have 
received are geared towards their terrorist groups and is understood through the 
creation of identities within a country who have been boxed in by the boundaries 
built by the ex-colonial powers. Nations that hold oil depend less on foreign 
intervention because there are more funds and therefore willingness to secure and 
control the oil-producing regions. A country with high levels of corruption can be 
perceived by other countries with distrust because of the unknown outcomes of a 
possible intervention, while a country that has lower levels of corruption can 
serve as a persuader for countries to intervene. 
 
3. Technique 
 
The use of a comparative research design serves to explore the cause of 
the differing levels of foreign intervention geared towards Boko Haram in Nigeria 
and al-Shabaab in Somalia. The use of the Most Similar System (MSS) is a 
helpful method to pinpoint the independent variable that best explains the cause of 
the dependent variable. According to Dr. Timothy C. Lim, "in methodological 
terms, the important point is that the characteristics the systems (countries) share 
can, in principle, be held constant and can, therefore, be considered irrelevant in 
explaining a particular social or political phenomenon that varies between or 
among the systems.”7 In this case, the different levels of relative state strength 
explain the different levels of foreign intervention that Nigeria (Boko Haram) and 
Somalia (al-Shabaab) have received. As mentioned, this is possible by underlining 
the similarities between the two countries and their terrorist groups. 
In comparing Nigeria (Boko Haram) and Somalia (al-Shabaab), there are 
various similarities between both countries and groups that help point to relative 
state strength as the cause of different levels of foreign intervention. Both groups 
                                                     
6 Simon Gray and Ibikunle Adeakin, "The Evolution of Boko Haram: From Missionary Activism 
to Transnational Jihad and the Failure of the Nigerian Security Intelligence Agencies," African 
Security 8, no. 3 (2015): 201. 
7 Timothy C. Lim, Doing Comparative Politics: An Introduction to Approaches and Issues 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), 34. 
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are Muslim and subscribe to Salafi jihadist ideology.8 Also, both groups have 
pledged allegiance to more capable and efficient terrorist organizations; Boko 
Haram is an ally of the Islamic State, and al-Shabaab is an ally of al-Qa’ida.9 Both 
groups operate in certain regions and neighboring countries. Boko Haram 
operates mainly in the northern regions of Nigeria while al-Shabaab mostly 
operates in the southern regions of Somalia.10 Outside of their respective 
countries, Boko Haram operates in Niger and Cameroon, and al-Shabaab in 
Kenya and Ethiopia.11 
The MSS method assists in ruling out these similarities as possible causes 
for the different levels of foreign intervention in Nigeria and Somalia. By 
eliminating these similarities as potential causes for the dependent variable, the 
MSS method narrows the possible independent variables. Subsequently, allowing 
for the emphasis on relative state strength as the cause of the various levels of 
foreign intervention. 
 
4. Evidence 
 
Therefore, it is essential to establish a baseline on how Nigeria’s and 
Somalia’s strength is rated. By comparing State Fragility Index and Matrix scores 
which provide an overall assessment of the strength of a country with provisional 
indicators, for example, poverty, education, and violence, this allows for a holistic 
understanding of the strength of a state. The relative strength of a state is 
understood through the coupling of state and provisional capacities. To 
understand how states are rated the Center for Systemic Peace provides a useful 
State Fragility Index & Matrix (SFIM), a baseline on how to rate Somalia and 
Nigeria. SFIM uses twelve indicators and provides three overall scores. 
                                                     
8 David Cook, "The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria," Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 
Sentinel 4, no. 9 (2011): 3.; Abukar Sanei, "Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram: Comparative Analysis 
and Policy Approaches," Center for Policy Analysis & Research (2015): 8. 
9 Clionadh Raleigh, Roudabeh Kishi, Olivia Russel, Joseph Siegle and Wendy Williams, "Boko 
Haram vs. al-Shabaab: What do we know about their patterns of violence?" The Washington Post, 
accessed May 14, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2017/10/02/boko-haram-vs-al-shabaab-what-do-we-know-about-their-patterns-of-
violence/?utm_term=.1247cb3351a9.  
10 Paul D. Williams, "After Westgate: Opportunities and Challenges in the War Against al-
Shabaab," International Affairs 90, no. 4 (2014): 914.; Manoj Harjani, "Nigeria’s Fight against 
Boko Haram," Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 5, no. 7 (2013): 12, accessed May 12, 2018, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/26351166. 
11 "The Evolution of Militant Islamist Group Activity in Africa 2010-2016," African Center for 
Strategic Studies, January 10, 2017, accessed June 09, 2018, 
http://africacenter.org/spotlight/evolution-militant-islamist-group-activity-africa-2010-2016/. 
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The security, political, economic, and social effectiveness of a country are 
added to provide an overall effectiveness score.12 SFIM also provides a legitimacy 
score by adding the security, political, economic, and social legitimacy of a 
country.13 The overall effectiveness score and legitimacy score are added, 
resulting in a country’s State Fragility Index and Matrix score.14 This score is 
used to compare and chart all the countries. Furthermore, SFIM uses referent 
indicators that provide a country’s most recent experience with armed conflict, 
regime type, net oil production or consumption, and whether a country has a 
Muslim majority or a non-Muslim majority population.15 Somalia has poor 
governance, experiencing armed conflict and has a Muslim majority and low 
levels of petroleum. While Nigeria has a more stable government, yet weak, 
experiencing armed conflict, a non-Muslim majority, and is a minor consumer of 
oil. 
Understanding how each country measures at a provisional level is useful 
and paired with the state score provides a holistic understanding of both countries. 
Somalia takes first place as the most violent state in Africa, with most of the 
attacks taking place in the south of the country where 32% of deaths were related 
to al-Shabaab as of 2010.16 In Somalia “extreme poverty is highest in internally 
displaced person settlements, followed by the rural North West, Mogadishu, 
North West urban and lastly by rural and urban North East.”17 The Somali 
population overall share a low education attainment rate, with madrassas filling 
most of the void.18 Madrassas are Islamic schools that have supplanted other 
education systems in Somalia 
The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) shows 
that the second most violent country in Africa is Nigeria with most of the violence 
taking place in the northern and central provinces of Nigeria.19 According to the 
Center of Global Development out of 36 states, 18 have poverty rates higher than 
the national poverty rate with 17 of those states located in the north.20 The United 
                                                     
12 Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall, 7. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 8-10. 
16 "Summary of Political Violence and Protest in Somalia," Armed Conflict Location & Event 
Project, January 2018, accessed May 20, 2018, https://www.acleddata.com/dashboard/#706. 
17 "Somali Poverty Profile," United Nations Children's Emergency Fund, June 2017: 68. 
18 "Country Profile: Somalia," United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2016: 16-17. 
19 "Summary of Political Violence and Protest in Nigeria," Armed Conflict Location & Event 
Project, January 2018, accessed May 20, 2018, https://www.acleddata.com/dashboard/#566. 
20 Zuhumnan Dapel, “Poverty in Nigeria: Understanding and Bridging the Divide between North 
and South,” Center for Global Development, April 6, 2018, accessed August 14, 2018, 
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Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) country profile on Nigeria 
underlines the lack of access to education in the north of the country.21 Northern 
Nigeria one of the poorest regions also lacks proper educational funds for youth. 
With many young people in the area and limited opportunities for education and 
high levels of poverty, Boko Haram poses as an enticing group to join. 
Moreover, it is imperative to analyze the foreign interventions in both 
countries. Five countries constitute AMISOM: Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, and Uganda. While Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and 
Zambia provide police forces.22  AMISOM's military component is divided into 
five sectors. The first sector consists of the regions Banadir, and Lower Shabelle 
which belong to Ugandan troops. Sector two includes the regions of Lower, and 
Middle Jubba corresponds to Kenyan forces, sector three composed of Bay, 
Bakkool and Gedo are under Ethiopian command. Sector four includes Hiiraan, 
and Galgaduud and belongs to Djiboutian forces. Burundian forces command 
sector five covering the Middle Shabelle region.23 
The five sectors of AMISOM cover the southern section of Somalia, all 
areas south of Galguguud fall under a sector. AMISOM also works alongside the 
Somali National Army (SNA) with support from the African Union (AU). The 
SNA lacks training and is accused of rape and human rights violations.24 
AMISOM has taken a role as the overseer of much of Somalia's territory due to 
the ghost-like Somali government. In this role, AMISOM has caused significant 
blows to al-Shabaab, causing it to focus more on civilian targets.25 
The Somali government has received support from the United States such 
as airstrikes which have helped reduce the al-Shabaab threat.26 Somalia has a 
history of contemporary individual interventions, Ethiopia occupied Somalia from 
2006-2009 with about 8,000 to 15,000 troops.27 Similarly, in October 2011—
                                                     
https://www.cgdev.org/blog/poverty-nigeria-understanding-and-bridging-divide-between-north-
and-south. 
21 "Country Profile: Nigeria," United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2016: x. 
22 "African Union Mission in Somalia Military Component," AMISOM, accessed May 17, 2018, 
http://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/military-component/. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Josh Meservey, "Al-Shabaab’s Somali Safe Havens: A Springboard for Terror," Perspectives on 
Terrorism 7, no. 6 (2013): 95-96, http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.lib.csusb.edu/stable/26297067. 
25 Syed Huzaifah Bin Othman Alkaff, and Nur Aziemah Azman, "Somalia," Counter Terrorist 
Trends and Analyses 8, no. 1 (2015): 121, 
http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.lib.csusb.edu/stable/26369579. 
26 Williams, 915. 
27 Brian J. Hesse, "Introduction: The Myth of ‘Somalia’," Journal of Contemporary African 
Studies 28, no. 3 (2010): 248. 
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Kenya Defense forces entered Somalia to defend its citizens from al-Shabaab—
this was followed by another Ethiopian invasion a few months later.28 
On the other hand, MNJTF was established in April 2012 and is composed 
of Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigerian armed forces.29 MNJTF 
operations are split into four sectors, sector one corresponds to a Cameroonian 
brigade, sector two belongs to a Chadian brigade, the Nigerian 7th brigade 
controls the third sector, and the fourth sector belongs to the 5th military regiment 
of Niger.30 Benin contributes through its responsibilities in MNJTF garrisons.31 
All the sectors are in the Lake Chad Basin, and the MNJTF is present in three 
states in northeastern Nigeria: Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe. 
Boko Haram’s attacks concentrate on or near the Lake Chad Basin 
explaining why most of the MNJTF sectors are near the lake. According to the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Boko Haram's 
attacks in the region coupled with years of drought, recent heavy rain and 
flooding have resulted in 7.7 million people in need of humanitarian assistance.32 
The most impacted Nigerian states are Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe, covered by 
the Nigerian sector three of the MNJTF. Nigeria has had difficulty assisting 
people located near the Lake Chad Basin who depend on water, fishing, and 
agriculture. The situation will continue to deteriorate because about 90% of the 
Lake Chad Basin has evaporated.33 
Nigeria has received much-needed training in intelligence-gathering from 
the United States. As Hussein Solomon remarks, “there is a dearth of human 
intelligence assets in the Nigerian State.”34 The United States has provided 
Nigeria intelligence and training to develop intelligence capabilities to assist 
                                                     
28 Brian J. Hesse, "Two Generations, Two Interventions in One of the World's Most-Failed States: 
The United States, Kenya, and Ethiopia in Somalia," Journal of Asian and African Studies 51, no. 
5 (2016): 583-585. 
29 Isaac Olawale Albert, "Rethinking the Functionality of the Multinational Joint Task Force in 
Managing the Boko Haram Crisis in the Lake Chad Basin," Africa Development / Afrique Et 
Développement 42, no. 3 (2017): 120, 124, 
http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.lib.csusb.edu/stable/90018137. 
30 "Multinational Joint Task Force Sectors," Multinational Joint Task Force, accessed May 24, 
2018, https://www.mnjtf.org/sectors/. 
31 Ibid. 
32 “Lake Chad Basin-Complex Emergency,” United States Agency for International Development, 
August 2, 2018, accessed August 20, 2018, 2,4. 
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/lake_chad_ce_fs19_08-02-2018.pdf. 
33 Mariama Sow. “Figure of the Week: The Shrinking Lake Chad,” Brookings Institute, February 
9, 2017, accessed August 21, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-
focus/2017/02/09/figure-of-the-week-the-shrinking-lake-chad/. 
34 Hussein Solomon, "Counter-terrorism in Nigeria: Responding to Boko Haram," The RUSI 
Journal 157, no. 4 (2012): 8. 
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Nigeria in curtailing Boko Haram.35 Nigeria has obstructed numerous operations 
against Boko Haram because of extra-judicial killings by the Joint Task Force 
created by ex-president Goodluck Jonathan.36 
 
5. Analysis & Key Judgments 
 
The MSS method assists in ruling out similarities between Nigeria (Boko 
Haram) and Somalia (al-Shabaab) as variables that are unable to explain the 
different levels of foreign intervention a country receives. Afterward, the MSS 
method helps outline potential independent variables such as corruption, identity 
fissures, and oil as the sole explanation for the different levels of foreign 
intervention. In ruling out these possible independent variables, the MSS method 
allows for the underlining of the strength of a state as the cause of different levels 
of foreign intervention. The strength of a state is essential to stopping threats to 
the government, population, and infrastructure. Hence increasing the strength of a 
state increases possibilities of a country surviving and foiling terrorist attacks 
while also making it difficult for terrorist groups to recruit members. 
When looking at Nigeria and Somalia, both countries have low levels of 
state strength. It is important to note that Somalia's strength is lower than that of 
Nigeria, and here is where a larger, more funded AMISOM comes into play. 
Nigeria's MNJTF has fewer members, and capabilities because of Nigeria's 
capacities to check Boko Haram's activities. Nigeria is a member of MNJTF 
which means they have an active say on operations but also attests to Nigeria’s 
capabilities, while Somalia through the SNA plays a sideline role in AMISOM. 
The possible independent variables all have merit, but they are not stand-
alone causes for the dependent variable. Instead, through the MSS method, these 
possible variables help to reinforce that a state's strength explains the levels of 
foreign intervention a country receives in dealing with a terrorist group. The 
ability of a state to have a united populace, properly use resources and have low 
levels of corruption can decrease a state’s fragility. Populations that can co-exist 
will create a united country helping leaders to move forward with projects and 
operations. Countries with oil or other resources can use the funds obtained from 
the selling of resources to invest in its infrastructure, education system, economy 
                                                     
35 "Fact Sheet: U.S. Effort to Assist the Nigerian Government in its fight Against Boko Haram," 
The White House President Barak Obama, accessed May 16, 2018, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/10/14/fact-sheet-us-efforts-assist-
nigerian-government-its-fight-against-boko-. 
36 Gbemisola Abdul-Jelil Animasawun, "The Military and Internal Security Operations in 
Nigeria's Fourth Republic: Rethinking Security for Positive Peace in Maiduguri, Nigeria," Peace 
Research 44/45, no. 2/1 (2012): 118, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24429462. 
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and increase security efforts in areas impacted by terrorist groups. A nation with 
minimal to no corruption would result in better governance. 
According to the SFIM Nigeria is a weak state and scores poorly in every 
aspect of the index but lands outside of the failed state section. Nigeria has 
managed to remain just a few scores away from being labeled a failed state. The 
provisional indicators such as education, violence, and poverty for Nigeria point 
to the regional disparities within the state. The north of Nigeria is overall 
neglected when compared to the south.37 This disparity is highlighted in Boko 
Haram’s rise and continued attacks in northern Nigeria. Boko Haram has 
exploited such divisions between the north and south in order to flourish.38 
Nigeria is overall a weak country, but it is much weaker in the northern regions. 
Nigeria’s religious tension divides the country in half. The religious 
tension hinders Nigeria from rising passed a weak state score. Such division was 
displayed during the 2015 presidential elections between Goodluck Jonathan, a 
Christian and Muhammadu Buhari (current president), a Muslim. Most of the 
Muslim north favored Muhammadu Buhari while the Christian south favored 
Goodluck Jonathan.39 Nigeria's north and south divide cuts through its social, 
economic and political landscapes. 
For this reason, if the SFIM only considered the southern region of 
Nigeria, it would score further away from the failed section. Nigeria might be 
labeled a weak state, but in certain aspects, this is untrue.40 As the country tries to 
tackle the Boko Haram crisis, it is also dealing with militias in the Nigerian Delta. 
Motives for the militias in the Nigeria Delta are non-religious; instead, they 
demand a clean environment and a share of the profits from the oil extracted from 
the area.41 The Nigeria Delta holds large amounts of oil deposits but is suffering 
from armed conflicts between militias and government forces. The lack of 
economic opportunities for locals has led to numerous illegal and unsafe oil 
extracting procedures. 
The Nigeria government has different options to stop the unrest. If Nigeria 
provides economic opportunities and helps clean the area, it would minimize the 
militias in the region.  The demands of the militias in the Nigerian Delta has 
                                                     
37 John S. Olanrewaju, "Globalization of Terrorism: A Case Study of Boko Haram in 
Nigeria," International Journal of Politics and Good Governance 6 (2015): 3. 
38 Daniel Egiegba Agbiboa, "Why Boko Haram Exists: The Relative Deprivation 
Perspective," African Conflict & Peacebuilding Review 3, no. 1 (2013): 151. 
39 "How Nigeria's Presidential Election Works," BBC, March 2015, accessed May 25, 2018, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31111572. 
40 Samuel Oyewole, "Boko Haram and the Challenges of Nigeria's War on Terror," Defense & 
Security Analysis 29, no. 3 (2013): 253. 
41 Felix Akpan, Okonette Ekanem, and Angela Olofu-Adeoye, "Boko Haram Insurgency and the 
Counter-Terrorism Policy in Nigeria," Canadian Social Science 10, no. 2 (2014): 153. 
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caused disdain in the Nigeria government, but these demands do not threaten the 
security of the state as does Boko Haram. Nigeria is experiencing two significant 
problems one in the north with Boko Haram and the Nigeria Delta militias in the 
south. The south has higher educational opportunities and lower poverty rates. 
Boko Haram operates mainly in the northern states where the government has 
failed to alleviate any religious marginalization.42 Although the president of 
Nigeria is now Muslim, it will take a while for the north to close the gap with the 
south regarding education, employment, and poverty rates. 
Nigeria’s mishandling of issues in the north has helped Boko Haram thrive 
and brought about the MNJTF to the northern region, in specific towards the Lake 
Chad Basin.43 The porous borders in the area have allowed Boko Haram to attack 
the neighboring countries of Chad and Cameroon. Porous borders allow Boko 
Haram to come and go as they please, yet, the same borders limit Nigerian forces. 
Borders are a sophisticated infrastructure to establish and maintain. For instance, 
shared boundaries between countries are more secure if both nations are active in 
patrolling the area. Surrounding nations have to do their part in maintaining and 
securing the shared borders. 
Nonetheless, Nigeria is making strides towards achieving secure borders. 
There have been border shutdowns, and curfews, but these rules are inapplicable 
to a non-state actor like Boko Haram.44 Nigeria shares borders with Benin, 
Cameroon, Chad, and Niger where porous borders have existed before Boko 
Haram’s rise. Boko Haram has added to the instability in the border regions 
especially those Nigeria shares with Cameroon, Chad, and Niger through attacks 
and kidnappings. 
Boko Haram mainly operates in the north, and it is no coincidence that the 
states with the highest poverty rates, the regions with the most violence, and least 
educational opportunities are home to such group. Corruption within Nigeria and 
its agencies and security forces obstruct its ability to become a stronger state. For 
instance, John Campbell argues that Nigeria is facing a fundamental issue due to 
“the institutionalized corruption that channels money into the pockets of few 
Nigerian big men.”45 This corruption has penetrated many levels of the Nigerian 
government. Boko Haram's early backing came from alienated northern 
                                                     
42 Daniel Egiegba Agbiboa, "Ethno-religious Conflicts and the Elusive Quest for National Identity 
in Nigeria," Journal of Black Studies 44, no. 1 (2013): 21-23, accessed May 12, 2018, 
http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.lib.csusb.edu/stable/23414701. 
43 Usman A. Tar and Mala Mustapha, "The Emerging Architecture of a Regional Security 
Complex in the Lake Chad Basin," Africa Development / Afrique Et Développement 42, no. 3 
(2017): 110-111, accessed May 9, 2018, http://www.jstor.org/stable/90018136. 
44 Solomon, 7. 
45 John Campbell, "Nigeria's Battle for Stability," The National Interest, no. 118 (2012): 32. 
accessed May 12, 2018, http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.lib.csusb.edu/stable/42896438.  
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politicians within both of the primary parties in hopes of using them as leverage.46 
Nigeria's corruption is rooted in its federalist system. 
When looking at Somalia, it is clear that it is a failed state, explaining the 
substantial amount of foreign intervention it has received to counter al-Shabaab. 
According to the SFIM, Somalia is a failed state facing armed conflict as of mid-
2017 and has a weak democratic government.47 The index as stated before is an 
overall assessment of a country’s stability but, if a provisional assessment is 
conducted there would be no significant difference in the south where al-Shabaab 
operates. In the case of Somalia, most of the indicators for a state’s strength are 
spread out evenly in the country except for violence. Violence concentrates in the 
south. Somalia is a failed state throughout all of its regions, while the violence in 
the south is due to al-Shabaab. 
There is one caveat in Somalia because al-Shabaab at times has provided 
education, training, security, the rule of law, food and employment. Through civil 
services, Oscar Gakuo Mwangi argues that al-Shabaab focuses on "community-
level operations" to build "local-community infrastructure and support."48 Most of 
these efforts are located in the regions al-Shabaab controls in southern Somalia. 
Al-Shabaab has attempted to fill the regulatory void in Somalia through its vision 
of how a government should operate. Here is where madrassas sponsored by al-
Shabaab educate the youth, and other efforts to keep the population productive 
occur. Services provided by al-Shabaab present difficulties in measuring 
indicators such as educational attainment. Therefore, populations in al-Shabaab-
controlled regions might have higher education attainment rates, security and 
more food but it is difficult to measure these indicators. 
AMISOM's five sectors concentrate in the southern section of Somalia. 
The Somali government is weak and is unable to provide basic needs, services 
and security.49 Somalia’s failed state status and skeleton-like government are the 
norms in the country. Although the motives are debatable, to be that Kenya 
invaded Somalia once, and Ethiopia invaded Somalia twice. Somalia’s failed state 
status explains the large intervention force it has received from AMISOM and the 
individual invasions from Kenya and Ethiopia. 
                                                     
46 Carlo Davis," Anatomy of African Terrorism Boko Haram: Nigeria's Homegrown Terror 
Network," World Policy Journal 29, no. 4 (2012): 16, 
http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.lib.csusb.edu/stable/23326708. 
47 Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall, 7. 
48 Oscar Gakuo Mwangi, "State Collapse, al-Shabaab, Islamism, and Legitimacy in 
Somalia," Politics, Religion & Ideology 13, no. 4 (2012): 526-527. 
49 Ken Menkhaus, "State Collapse and Local Response in Somalia," in Failed States and Fragile 
Societies: A New World Disorder?, ed. by Ingo Trauschweizer and Steven M. Miner, 142, 
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 2014), http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1rfsq1z.10. 
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In comparing the cases of Somalia and Nigeria, Somalia's failed state 
status severely influenced the level of foreign intervention it received. This 
intervention can be seen through AMISOM and the multitude of countries who 
have placed troops and police forces in Somalia. The invasion of Somalia by both 
Ethiopia and Kenya also highlights the fact that Somalia's government and 
therefore its agencies and security forces were unable to take care of the al-
Shabaab threat on their own. 
Nigeria, on the other hand, is stronger than Somalia but by a low margin. 
For Nigeria, Boko Haram is the major threat in the north due to porous borders, 
corruption, and religious division.50 Nigeria is taking steps with help from the 
United States to improve its intelligence gathering capabilities showing why 
Nigeria is labeled a weak state and not a failed state.51 A country with an 
intelligence apparatus that is being revamped underlines efforts to stop Boko 
Haram. By comparison, AMISOM troops have supplemented Somalia's 
government and its military that is weak and incapable of such tasks.52 
Somalia has less of an influence on who intervenes in its soil; while 
Nigeria has a significant influence on who intervenes. Nigeria has a stronger 
security apparatus; for example, in 2011 the federal government established the 
“Military Joint Task Force (JTF) compromised of the Army, Navy, Air Force, 
Department of State Security, and the Nigeran Police."53 The Nigerian 
government is capable of enforcement, but internal factors impede it from 
becoming a stronger state which would make the MNJTF unnecessary to contain 
Boko Haram. 
If Somalia were a stronger state, this would enable it to handle security 
issues and depend less on AMISOM and other foreign actors. Unfortunately, 
Somalia remains a failed state, and continues to have an active AMISOM mission 
providing security, clinics and basic needs, for example, food and medicine.54 On 
the contrary, Nigeria has resources and governmental structure but has to cope 
with its growing corruption, divisions, and Boko Haram. Numerous factors play 
into state strength, which explains the different levels of foreign intervention. 
 
6. Implications 
                                                     
50 Romanri Loimeier, "Boko Haram: The Development of a Militant Religious Movement in 
Nigeria," Africa Spectrum 47, no. 2/3 (2012): 137, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23350455. 
51 Richard Downie, "Collective Insecurity in the Sahel: Fighting Terror with Good 
Governance." Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 16, no. 1 (2015): 70-71, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/43773669. 
52 Sally Healy, "IGAD and Regional Security in the Horn," in Routledge Handbook of African 
Security, ed. James J. Hentz (Routledge, 2013): 217. 
53 Abdul-Jelil Animasawun, 118.  
54"AMISOM Mandate," African Union Mission in Somalia, accessed May 15, 2018, 
http://amisom-au.org/amisom-mandate/. 
12
OSR Journal of Student Research, Vol. 5 [2019], Art. 352
https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/osr/vol5/iss1/352
    
13 
 
In answering why countries dealing with terrorist groups receive different 
amounts of foreign intervention, the strength of a state was shown as the primary 
cause for such dissimilarities. Scholars and policymakers must try to work within 
the current Westphalian-state system to provide security, social services, food, 
and other necessities to the people of Nigeria and Somalia. The change of the 
Westphalian-state system is long overdue, but making sure policies are aimed at 
helping those in need should be the primary objective. 
Furthermore, the strength of a state is arguably more important now than 
ever due to the growing threat from terrorist organizations in Africa.55 There are 
essential steps states can take to increase the possibilities of strengthening their 
departments, agencies, and overall government. Such as tackling corruption 
through anti-corruption campaigns. An anti-corruption campaign will look 
different in every country due to the complex social, economic and political 
climate in each state. Policy and initiatives aimed at rooting out corrupt officials 
and easing tensions within a nation are everyday actions nations should pursue. 
These countries can better withstand the onslaught by terrorist groups. 
Dissolving divisions within a country, whether religious or ethnic, through 
co-existing campaigns can help minimize tensions and support for terrorist 
groups. Countries with ethnic and religious tensions need to focus on providing a 
political environment where differences are not used to promote specific agendas 
or discriminate against a group. By strengthening the state, a country is 
fundamentally strengthening its populations. If a country can strengthen itself, 
there is a high probability it can provide education, security, food, and 
employment for its people. There are limits to the recommendations, the history 
of corruption and patronage in Africa are lengthy and can hamper efforts to 
strengthen states. 
While Nigeria is less dependent on its neighbors (MNJTF), it must focus 
on ending the north-south divide. Nigeria benefits from being part of the MNJTF 
but can function independently from MNJTF to fight Boko Haram. Nigeria is 
capable of countering Boko Haram; it has a strong economy, funds, and military. 
Ending the division of the country will curtail Boko Haram's trajectory for years. 
Nigeria has a substantial amount of oil that can be used to strengthen the state, but 
the corruption and the division of its people must be addressed. 
Somalia is wholly reliant on AMISOM, and this dependency is weakening 
an already failed state. Somalia needs assistance to combat al-Shabaab, and the 
potential for overdependence on AMISOM may hinder Somalia from becoming a 
functioning country. For Somalia to provide employment, infrastructure, 
necessities and security for its population especially those in the south who suffer 
                                                     
55 Kwesi Aning and Naila Salihu, "The African Security Predicament," in Routledge Handbook of 
African Security, ed. James J. Hentz, (Routledge, 2013): 14-17. 
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from the most violence, it will have to overcome hurdles such as al-Shabaab. The 
SNA should relieve AMISOM of its duties by taking hold of operations. If the 
state of Somalia is unable to gain strength, it will continue relying on a foreign 
intervention that one day may run out of funds. The dependency on AMISOM and 
the need to eliminate al-Shabaab places Somalia in a dilemma. Does Somalia first 
become independent from AMISOM, and then focus on al-Shabaab? Or vice-
versa? If the transition is mishandled, it will be detrimental and would leave a 
failed state with a military incapable of confronting al-Shabaab and providing 
services to its population. 
Finally, Nigerian and Somalian leadership must comprehend that in trying 
to combat Boko Haram and al-Shabaab both countries will need a higher level of 
capabilities and cooperation with their neighbors. The borders set by the Berlin 
Congress limits how states can respond to terrorist groups. Boko Haram and al-
Shabaab do not adhere to the same boundaries as Nigeria and Somalia. In order to 
eliminate the terrorist threat, Nigeria and Somalia must be aware of the issues the 
Westphalian-state system has caused. Understanding how these issues impact 
each country respectively contributes to the overall path to strengthen the state. 
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